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Abstract—In this paper we provide an implementation, eval-
uation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware
[1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped
computers. In this case, a malicious code running on a com-
promised computer can control the power consumption of the
system by intentionally regulating the CPU utilization. Data is
modulated, encoded, and transmitted on top of the current flow
fluctuations, and then it is conducted and propagated through
the power lines. This phenomena is known as a ’conducted
emission’. We present two versions of the attack. Line level power-
hammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the in-home power
lines1 that are directly attached to the electrical outlet. Phase level
power-hammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the power
lines at the phase level, in the main electrical service panel. In
both versions of the attack, the attacker measures the emission
conducted and then decodes the exfiltrated data. We describe the
adversarial attack model and present modulations and encoding
schemes along with a transmission protocol. We evaluate the
covert channel in different scenarios and discuss signal-to-noise
(SNR), signal processing, and forms of interference. We also
present a set of defensive countermeasures. Our results show
that binary data can be covertly exfiltrated from air-gapped
computers through the power lines at bit rates of 1000 bit/sec
for the line level power-hammering attack and 10 bit/sec for the
phase level power-hammering attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information is the most critical asset of modern organiza-
tions, and accordingly it is coveted by adversaries. Protecting
IT networks from sophisticated cyber-attacks is quite a com-
plicated task, involving host level and network level security
layers. This includes updating protection software in the host
computers, configuring firewalls and routers, managing access
controls, using centralized credential systems, and so on.
Nevertheless, despite a high degree of protection, as long
as the local area network has a connection with the outside
world (e.g., the Internet), irrespective of the level or type of
protection, an innovative and persistent attacker will eventually
find a way to breach the network, eavesdrop, and transmit
sensitive data outward (e.g., see the Vault 7 [2], Sony [3], and
Yahoo [4] incidents).
A. Air-Gapped Networks
When sensitive data is involved, an organization may resort
to so-called ’air-gap’ isolation. An air-gapped network is
1Commonly referred to as electrical wiring or household electricity mains.
this paper they will be referred to simply as power lines
a secured computer network in which measures are taken
to maintain both physical and logical separation from less
secured networks. The air-gap separation is maintained by
enforcing strict regulations such as prohibiting connectivity
to unauthorized equipment and hardening the workstations in
the network. Today, air-gapped networks are used in military
and defense systems, critical infrastructure, the finance sector,
and other industries [5], [6]. Two examples of air-gapped
networks are the United States Defense Intelligence Agencys
NSANET and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
System (JWICS) classified networks [7]. However, even air-
gapped networks are not immune to breaches. In the past
decade, it has been shown that attackers can successfully pen-
etrate air-gapped networks by using complex attack vectors,
such as supply chain attacks, malicious insiders, and social
engineering [8], [9], [10]. In 2017, WikiLeaks published a
reference to a hacking tool dubbed ’Brutal Kangaroo’ used to
infiltrate air-gapped computers via USB drives [11]. This tool
was used by the attackers to infect the Internet workstations
of an organization’s employees, and wait for an employee to
insert the infected USB drive into an air-gapped computer.
Using such tools, attackers can breach the network, bypassing
security systems such as AVs, firewalls, intrusion detection
and prevention systems (IDS/IPS), and the like.
B. Air-Gap Covert Channels
After deploying a malware in the air-gapped network, the
attacker may, at some point, wish to leak information - a be-
havior commonly used in advanced persistent threats (APTs).
However, despite the fact that breaching air-gapped systems
has been shown feasible, the exfiltration of data from an air-
gapped system remains a challenge. Over the years, various
out-of-band communication methods to leak data through
air-gaps have been proposed. For example, electromagnetic
covert channels have been studied for at least twenty years.
In this type of communication, a malware modulates binary
information over the electromagnetic waves radiating from
computer components (LCD screens, communication cables,
computer buses, and hardware peripherals [12], [13], [14],
[15], [16]). Other types of air-gap covert channels based
on magnetic [17],[18], acoustic [19], [20] optical, [21] and
thermal [22] emissions have also been investigated.
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Fig. 1: A (simplified) schematic diagram of the electricity
network
C. Exfiltration through Power Lines
In this paper, we present a new type of electric (current
flow) covert channel. The method, dubbed PowerHammer,
enables attackers to exfiltrate information from air-gapped
networks through AC power lines. We show that a malware
running on a computer can regulate the power consumption
of the system by controlling the workload of the CPU. Binary
data can be modulated on the changes of the current flow,
propagated through the power lines, and intercepted by an
attacker. We present two versions of the attack. In line level
power-hammering the adversary taps the power cables feeding
the transmitting computer. In phase level power-hammering
the adversary taps the power lines at the phase level, in
the main electrical service panel. Using a non-invasive tap,
the attacker measures the emission conducted on the power
cables. Based on the signal received, the transmitted data is
demodulated and decoded back to a binary form.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Technical
background is provided in Section II. Related work is pre-
sented in Section III. The adversarial attack model is discussed
in Section IV. Communication, modulation and protocol de-
tails are described in Section V. Section VI provide the
analysis and evaluation results. Countermeasures are discussed
in Section VII. We conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
A. Electricity Network
The electrical grid refers to the electrical network which
supplies electricity to the end consumers. The electricity is
supplied to the consumers (e.g., industrial buildings, homes,
farms, etc.) through power lines. Fig. 1 illustrates a simplified
electricity network, all the way from the power station to an
end consumer. The power station generates electricity from
steam, by burning fossils such as coal or natural gas. The
voltage increases up to 400kV using step-up transformers and
is transmitted through high voltage power lines to the city’s
power station. From city stations, the electricity is supplied to
large buildings (e.g., at 11kV) and small residential buildings
(e.g., at 220v).
1) Phases: The typical in-door electrical supply network
is comprised of a distribution board (controlled from the
main electrical service panel) that divides electrical power
into subsidiary phases. Each phase feeds several to dozens
of circuits. An illustration of such a network is presented
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Fig. 3: In-door power distribution
in Fig. 2. The distribution to three different phases prevents
internal wall wires from overheating, and allow to run fairly
large loads.
2) Power line distribution in building: Electricity distribu-
tion in buildings is managed in a main, centralized electrical
service panel (Fig. 3). Every floor in the building has a
dedicated electrical service panel, which is connected to the
main service panel of the building. The power cords are
connected to the floor panel with circuit breakers.
B. Switch-Mode Power Supplies
Computers consume power using their power supplies.
Today, modern switch-mode power supplies (SMPS) are used
in all types of modern electronic equipment, including com-
puters, TVs and mobile phones. The main advantages of
SMPSs over the older linear power supplies include their
higher efficiency, smaller size, and lighter weight. Technically,
an SMPS transfers power from a 220V AC source to several
DC loads while converting voltage and current characteristics.
Briefly, in the SMPS, the AC power passes through fuses
and a line filter, and then is rectified by a full-wave bridge
rectifier. Next, the rectified voltage is applied to the power
factor correction (PFC) pre-regulator followed by DC to DC
converters. An in-depth discussion on the design of SMPSs
is beyond the scope of this paper, and we refer the interested
reader to handbooks on this topic [23].
1) Power Line Conducted Emission: The SMPS generates
electromagnetic radiation due to the fast switching current
and voltage they generate during the normal operation [23],
[24], [25]. The radiated noise is also leaked to the power
lines due to electromagnetic conductive processes, known
as conduction emission [26], [27]. As investigated in many
works in this field, the source of the electromagnetic and
conductive noise is rooted in the internal transistors and their
switching states [23], [28], [24]. The switching generates AC
voltage and current flows through the internal circuits which
produces electromagnetic emissions. Although these emissions
can be limited with proper design and shielding, there is still
interference from high frequency transformers in the power
supply [23], [24].
Note that there are various regulations on the permitted lev-
els of the radiated and conducted emissions from electronic de-
vices. Commercially available power supplies are designed to
meet these regulations. The FCC Part 15 regulations requires
that the conducted emission be controlled at the frequency
bands of 450kHz-30MHz (or 150kHz-30MHz) [29][30]. Our
covert channel uses frequencies lower than 24kHz, and hence
works even with computers that are fully complaint with
these regulations. Studies on the topic of electromagnetic and
conductive noise and their implications can be found in [26],
[27]. Our method exploits the conducted emission to modulate
binary information on the power lines. We show that a mali-
cious code can influence the momentary power consumption
of the computer, generating data-modulated conduction on the
power lines in the low frequency band. The generated noise
travels along the input power lines and can be measured by
an attacker probing the power cables.
III. RELATED WORK
Air-gap covert channels are special covert channels that
enable communication from air-gapped computers - mainly for
the purpose of data exfiltration. In 2018, researcher Mordechai
Guri coinded the term bridgeware [1] to refer to the class
of malware that exploits air-gap covert channels in order to
bridge the air-gap between isolated computers/ networks and
attackers. The covert channels can be classified into five main
categories: electromagnetic, magnetic, acoustic, thermal, and
optical. This paper introduce the electric (current flow) based
covert channel.
A. Electromangetic
In the past twenty years, various studies have explored the
use of electromagnetic emanation for covert communication.
Back in 1998, Kuhn et al showed that it is possible to regulate
the electromagnetic emissions from computer display cables
[13]. They showed that it is possible to control the frequencies
of the generated electromagnetic waves precisely and modulate
information on top of them. Based on this work, Thiele [31]
presented an open-source program (Tempest for Eliza) which
uses the computer monitor to transmit AM radio signals modu-
lated with audio. He demonstrated the method by transmitting
the tune Beethoven’s tune, Letter to Elise, and showed how it
could be heard from a simple radio receiver located nearby.
More recently, Guri et al demonstrated AirHopper [12], [5],
a malware that exfiltrates data from air-gapped computers
to a nearby smartphone via radio signals emitted from the
screen cable. The covert transmissions are received by the
FM radio receiver which is integrated into many modern
smartphones. In 2015, Guri et al demonstrated GSMem [16],
malware that leaks data from air-gapped computers to nearby
mobile phones. They successfully generated frequencies in the
cellular bands (in the GSM, UMTS, and LTE specifications)
from the buses which connect the RAM and the CPU. The
transmission received by a rootkit hidden in the baseband
processor of a nearby mobile-phone. In 2016, Guri et al
presented USBee, a malware that uses the USB data buses
to generate electromagnetic signals from a desktop computer
[32]. The transmissions could be picked up by a simple RF
receiver in a radius of several meters. Similarly, researchers
also proposed using GPIO ports of printers to generate covert
radio signals for the purpose of data exfiltration [33].
B. Magnetic
In 2018, Guri et al presented ODINI [17], a malware
that can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via low
frequency magnetic signals generated by the computer’s CPU
cores. They showed that the low-frequency magnetic fields
bypass Faraday cages and metal shields. Guri et al also
demonstrated MAGNETO [18], a malware which is capable of
leaking data from air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones
via magnetic signals. They used the magnetometer sensor
integrated in smartphones to measure the change in magnetic
fields. Matyunin suggested using the head of magnetic hard
disk drives (the actuator arm) to generate magnetic emission,
which can be received by a nearby smartphone magnetic
sensor [34].
C. Optical
Several studies have proposed the use of optical emanation
from computers for covert communication. Loughry intro-
duced the use of PC keyboard LEDs (caps-lock, num-lock and
scroll-lock) to encode binary data [35]. The main drawback
of this method is that it is not completely covert. Since
keyboard LEDs don’t typically flash, the user may detect the
communication. In 2017, Guri et al presented LED-it-GO, a
covert channel that uses the hard drive (HDD) indicator LED
in order to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers [21]. Guri
et al also presented a method for data exfiltration from air-
gapped networks via router and switch LEDs [36]. In the case
of HDDs and routers, the devices blinks frequently, and hence,
the transmissions performed via these channels will not raise
the user’s suspicious. Research showed that data can also be
leaked optically through fast blinking images or low contrast
invisible bitmaps projected on the LCD screen [37]. In 2017,
Guri et al presented aIR-Jumper, a malware that uses security
cameras and their IR LEDs to covertly communicate with
air-gapped networks from a distance of hundreds of meters
[38]. Similarly, Lopes presented a hardware based approach
for leaking data using infrared LEDs maliciously installed on
a storage device. Note that their approach requires the attacker
to deploy the compromised hardware in the organization.
D. Thermal
In 2015, Guri et al introduced BitWhisper [22], a thermal
covert channel allowing an attacker to establish bidirectional
communication between two adjacent air-gapped comput-
ers via temperature changes. The heat is generated by the
CPU/GPU of a standard computer and received by temperature
sensors that are integrated into the motherboard of the nearby
computer.
E. Acoustic
In acoustic covert channels, data is transmitted via inaudible,
ultrasonic sound waves. Audio based communication between
computers was reviewed by Madhavapeddy et al in 2005 [39].
In 2013, Hanspach [19] used inaudible sound to establish
a covert channel between air-gapped laptops equipped with
speakers and microphones. Their botnet established commu-
nication between two computers located 19 meters apart
and can achieve a bit rate of 20 bit/sec. Deshotels [40]
demonstrated the acoustic covert channel with smartphones,
and showed that data can be transferred up to 30 meters away.
The aforementioned ultrasonic covert channels are relevant
to environments in which the computers are equipped with
both speakers and microphones, a less common setup in
many secure environments. To overcome this limitation, Guri
et al presented MOSQUITO [41] a malware that covertly
turns headphones, earphones, or simple earbuds connected
to a PC into a pair of microphones, even when a standard
microphone is muted, taped, turned off or not present. Using
this technique they established so-called speaker-to-speaker
ultrasonic communication between two or more computers in
the same room.
In 2016, Guri et al introduced Fansmitter, a malware
which facilitates the exfiltration of data from an air-gapped
computer via noise intentionally emitted from PC fans [42].
In this method, the transmitting computer does not need to
be equipped with audio hardware or an internal or external
speaker. Guri et al also presented DiskFiltration a method
that uses the acoustic signals emitted from the hard disk
drive (HDD) moving arm to exfiltrate data from air-gapped
computers [20].
F. Electric (Power Consumption)
In this work we introduce the use of power lines to exfiltrate
data from air-gapped computers. Note that utilizing power
TABLE I: Summary of existing air-gap covert channels
Type Method
Electromagnetic
AirHopper [12], [5] (FM radio)
GSMem [16] (cellular frequencies)
USBee [32] (USB bus emission)
Funthenna [33] (GPIO emission)
Magnetic
MAGNETO [18] (CPU-generated
magnetic fields)
ODINI [17] (Faraday shields bypass)
Hard-disk-drive [34]
Electric (current) PowerHammer (this paper)
Acoustic
Fansmitter [42] (computer fan noise)
DiskFiltration [20] (hard disk noise)
Ultrasonic [19], [43]
MOSQUITO [41] (speaker-to-speaker
ultrasonic communication)
Thermal BitWhisper [22] (heat emission)
Optical
LED-it-GO [21] (hard drive LED)
VisiSploit [37] (invisible pixels)
Keyboard LEDs [35]
Router LEDs [36]
Optical (infrared) aIR-Jumper [38] (security cameras)
cables for carrying data is well known technique, usually re-
ferred to as power-line communication (PLC) [44]. Today, the
PLC technologies are used for a wide range of industrial and
home applications, including high-speed Internet, machine-to-
machine communication, smart homes and so on. However,
all current PLC methods focus on a non-malicious type of
communication. In addition, they require special modems for
the transmission and reception, which aim at filtering and
modulating/demodulating the information carried on the power
lines. We explore the use of power lines for a malicious
covert communication. We generate parasitic signals on the
power lines, using a malware running on a standard computer,
without the need for any additional hardware components for
transmission.
Table I. summarizes the existing air-gap covert channels.
IV. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK MODEL
The attack consists of four main steps: (1) system infection,
(2) receiver implantation, (3) data gathering, and (4) data
exfiltration.
A. System Infection
The adversarial attack model requires running a malicious
code in the targeted air-gapped computer. In the incursion
phase, the attacker infects the target system or network with
malware. Infecting highly secure and even air-gapped net-
works has been proven feasible in recent years. Note that
several APTs discovered in the last decade are capable of in-
fecting air-gapped networks [45], e.g., Turla [46], RedOctober
[47], and Fanny [48]. As a part of the targeted attack, the
adversary may infiltrate the air-gapped networks using social
engineering, supply chain attacks, or malicious insiders.
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Fig. 4: The receiver implantation: (a) on the power line feeding
the computer, and (b) on the power line in the main electrical
service panel
B. Receiver Implantation
The receiver is a non-invasive probe connected to a small
computer (for the signal processing). The probe is attached
to the power line feeding the computer (Fig. 4a) or the main
electric panel (Fig. 4b). It measures the current in the power
line, process the modulated signals, decodes the data and sends
it to the attacker (e.g., with Wi-Fi transceiver). An example
of such a hardware implant was presented in Snowden’s
leaked documents. In that case, the component, known as
COTTONMOUTH [49], was a USB connector with hidden
RF transceiver that attackers used to connect with air-gapped
networks by sending and receiving data to/from a long haul
relay subsystem .
C. Data Gathering
Having a foothold in the system, the malware starts re-
trieving interesting data for the attacker. The data might be
files, encryption keys, credential tokens, or passwords. The
data gathered is exfiltrated through a computer, usually a PC
workstation or server which contains the sensitive data to leak.
D. Exfiltration
In the last phase of the attack, the malware starts the data
leak by encoding the data and transmitting it via signals
injected to the power lines. The signals are generated by
changing the workload on the CPU cores. The transmissions
may take place at predefined times or in response to some
trigger infiltrated by the attacker. The signal is received by the
power line probe and delivered to the attacker (e.g., via Wi-Fi).
Note that although the described attack model is compli-
cated, it is not beyond the ability of motivated and capable
attackers. Advanced persistent threats coupled with sophisti-
cated attack vectors such as supply chain attacks and human
engineering have been shown to be feasible in the last decade.
As a reward for these efforts, the attacker can get his/her hands
on very valuable and secured information, which is out of
reach of other types of covert channels.
V. COMMUNICATION
In this section we describe the signal generation algorithm
and present the data modulation schemes and the transmission
protocol.
A. Signal Generation
As described in the scientific background section, changes
in the power consumption of a computer can be measured
on the power lines. In a standard computer, the current
flows primarily from wires that supply electricity from the
main power supply to the motherboard. The CPU is one of
the greatest consumers of power in the motherboard. Since
modern CPUs are energy efficient, the momentary workload
of the CPU directly affects the dynamic changes in its power
consumption [50]. By regulating the workload of the CPU,
it is possible to govern its power consumption, and hence
control the current flow in the cable. In the most elementary
case, overloading the CPU with calculations will consume
more current. Intentionally starting and stopping the CPU
workload allows us to generate a signal on the power lines
at specified frequency and modulate binary data over it. We
developed a fine-grained approach, in which we control the
workload of each of the CPU cores independently from the
other cores. Regulating the workload of each core separately
enables greater control of the momentary power consumption.
This approach has two main advantages:
1) Choosing which cores to operate on at a given time,
allows us to use only the currently available cores,
that is, cores which are not utilized by other processes.
This way, the transmission activity wont interrupt other
active processes in the system. This is important for the
usability of the computer and the stealth of the covert
channel.
2) By using different numbers of cores for the transmission,
we can control the current consumption (e.g., fewer
cores consume less power), and hence the amplitude of
the carrier wave. This allows us to employ amplitude
based modulations in which data is encoded on the
amplitude level of the signal.
To generate a carrier wave at frequency fc in one or more
cores, we control the utilization of the CPU at a frequency
correlated to fc. To that end, n worker threads are created
where each thread is bound to a specific core. To generate
the carrier wave, each worker thread overloads its core at
a frequency fc repeatedly alternating between applying a
continuous workload on its core for a time period of 1/2fc
C1 C2 C3 C4
Thread T3 Thread T4
Transmitting coresAvailable cores
CPU
Core 1 Core 2 Core 3 Core 4
Fig. 5: A CPU with two transmitting threads
(full power consumption) and putting its core in an idle state
for a time period of 1/2fc (no power consumption).
Algorithm 1 WorkerThread (iCore, freq, nCycles0,
nCycles1)
1: bindThreadToCore(iCore)
2: half cycle ms← 0.5 ∗ 1000/freq
3: while (!endTransmission()) do
4: if (data[i] = 0) then
5: sleep(nCycles0*half cycle ms*2)
6: else
7: for j ← 0 to nCycles1 do
8: T1← getCurrentT ime()
9: while (getCurrentT ime() − T1 <
half cycle ms) do ;
10: end while
11: sleep(half cycle ms)
12: end for
13: end if
14: end while
This operation is illustrated in Figure 5, which depicts a
system with two worker threads. Threads T3 and T4 are bound
to cores C3 and C4, respectively. Note that cores C1 and C2
dont participate in this transmission. When the worker threads
T3 and T4 start, they receive the required carrier frequency
fc and the stream of bits to transmit. The basic operation of
a worker thread is described in algorithm 1.
A worker thread receives the core to be bound to (iCore)
and the carrier frequency (freq). It also receives the number
of cycles for the modulation of logical ’0’ (nCycles0) and the
number of cycles for the modulation of logical ’1’ (nCycles1).
Note that the cycle time is derived from the frequency of the
carrier wave (line 2). The threads main function iterates on
the array of bits to transmit. In the case of logical ’0’ it
sleeps for nCycles0 cycles (line 5). In the case of logical
’1’ it repeatedly starts and stops the workload of the core
at the carrier frequency freq for nCycles1 cycles (lines 8-
10). We overload the core using the busy waiting technique.
This causes full utilization of the core for the time period and
returns.
Based on the algorithm above, we implemented a transmit-
ter for Linux Ubuntu (version 16.04, 64 bit). We used the
sched setaffinity system call to bind each thread to a
CPU core. The affinity is the thread level attribute that is con-
figured independently for each worker thread. To synchronize
the initiation and termination of the worker threads, we used
the thread mutex objects with pthread_mutex_lock()
and pthread_mutex_unlock() [51]. For thread sleeping
we used the sleep() system call [52]. Note that the precision
of sleep() is in milliseconds, and it is sufficient given the
frequencies of the carrier waves which are at 24kHz or lower.
B. Data Modulation & Communication Signals
Recall that the transmitting code can determine the fre-
quency of the signal by setting the cycle time in the signal gen-
eration algorithm. In the current research we used frequency
shift keying (FSK) for data modulation. In FSK the data is
represented by a change in the frequency of a carrier wave. For
the evaluation we used the binary frequency-shift keying (B-
FSK) modulation [54] outlined in Fig. 6. In this modulation,
only two different carrier frequencies are employed. Each
frequency is amplitude modulated, such that ’1’ and ’0’ are
two possible symbol combinations. The generalized form of
this modulation (M-FSK), is evaluated later, in Section VI.
In FSK, the length of each symbol is T , and the spectral
width is approximately ±1.5/T . Theoretically, this modulation
requires at least 4/T frequency spacing between different
carrier frequencies.
Frequency
Time
`0` f0
`1` f1
T
  3/T
  4/T
Fig. 6: Illustration of FSK modulation
The main advantage of the proposed modulation that it
does not require channel state information (CSI) when a non-
coherent receiver is applied [54]. Such a receiver (Fig. 7)
inludes the band-pass filters (BPFs) BPF0 and BPF1 that are
located around frequencies f0 and f1 respectively. The energy
of y0[n] and y1[n] signals is compared over a time period of
T and the received bit is determined by the highest energy
value.
In the following paragraphs, we discuss some of the results
regarding the B-FSK modulation. Fig. 7 presents the block
scheme of a receiver. A sample signal is presented in Fig. 8. In
this transmission (a sequence of ’0101000111’) the symbol’s
time is T = 5 msec which yields a bit rate of 200 bit/sec.
For each symbol, energies of y0[n] and y1[n] are compared,
as outlined in Fig. 8(b).
BPF1
BPF0
y[n]
y1[n]
y0[n]
 


1
0
2
1
N
n
ny
bit-
stream
 


1
0
2
0
N
n
ny
Time-
sync
>
<
Fig. 7: Block scheme of receiver
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Fig. 8: Time domain plot of a communication signal with
a symbol length of 5 msec (bit rate of 200 bit/sec) and
communication frequencies f0 = 10kHz and f1 = 18kHz
Fig. 9 shows the spectrogram (also termed as short-time
Fourier transform) of the ’0101000111’ sequence. In this case,
T = 5 msec which yields a bit rate of 200 bit/sec. We used the
two frequencies f0 = 10kHz and f1 = 18kHz for the B-FSK
modulation. The time spacing of the spectrogram was chosen
to match the symbol length of two bins per symbol. The
spectral width of the signals matches the theoretical bandwidth
of ∼= 3/T = 600Hz.
C. Bit-Framing
The data packets are transmitted in small frames. Each
frame consists of 44 bits and is comprised of a preamble,
payload, and CRC (cyclic redundancy check).
• Preamble. Like most air-gap covert channels, the unidi-
rectional communication means that the receiver cannot
establish a handshake with the transmitter, and hence
cannot determine or set the channel parameters before
the transmission. To solve this, a preamble header is
transmitted at the beginning of every packet. It consists of
a sequence of four alternating bits (’1010’) which helps
Fig. 9: Spectrogram of B-FSK communication at 200 bit/sec;
the transmitted signal is the ’0101000111’ sequence
the receiver determine the properties of the channel, such
as the carrier wave frequency and amplitude. In addition,
the preamble allows the receiver to detect the beginning
of a transmission and synchronize itself.
• Payload. The payload is the raw data to be transmitted.
In our case, we arbitrarily choose 32 bits as the payload
size.
• CRC. For error detection, we insert eight bits of CRC
code at the end of the frame. The receiver calculates the
CRC for the received payload, and if it differs from the
received CRC, an error is detected.
VI. ANALYSIS & EVALUATION
In this section we provide the analysis and evaluation of the
PowerHammer attack. We present the experimental setup and
discuss the measurements and results.
A. Experimental Setup
1) Measurement setup: Our measurement setup consists
of a current probe connected to a measurement system. For
measuring the current, we used a type of split core current
transformer. This is a non-invasive probe which is clamped
around the power line and measures the amount of current
passing through it (Fig. 10). The non-invasive probe behaves
like an inductor which responds to the magnetic field around
a current-carrying cable (Fig. 10 b). The amount of current in
the coil is correlated with the amount of current flowing in
the conductor. For our experiments we used SparkFun’s split
core current transformer ECS1030-L72 [53].
In this current sensor the output is sent through a 3.5mm
audio cable. We used a laptop computer (Dell Latitude E7450,
Windows 10 64-bit) as a measurement system, by connecting
the output cable to the audio input jack. The sampling rate was
set to 48kHz with a 16-bit resolution. For the signal processing
and data analysis we used the MathWorks MATLAB. For
real-time demodulation we used a custom FSK demodulator
we developed in Visual C++. As can be seen in Fig. 11 we
installed two measurement systems. System M1 was connected
to the power line feeding the transmitting computer and used
for the evaluation of the line level power-hammering. System
M2 was connected to the power line in the main electric
B(a) (b)
Fig. 10: A split core current transformer
panel and used for the evaluation of the phase level power-
hammering.
Main electrical 
service panel
P1
P2
P3
N
Transmitting computer
M1
M2
Fig. 11: The measurement setup
2) Transmitters: We measured the transmissions from three
types of computers: a desktop PC, a server, and a low power
device representing an IoT. With the low power device (Rasp-
berry Pi 3), we checked the feasibility of transmitting from
IoT devices that only have low power consumption. The list of
the computers with their specifications is provided in Table II.
The PC was running a Linux Ubuntu OS version 16.04.4 LTS
64-bit. The server was running a Linux Ubuntu OS version
16.04.1 LTS 64-bit (kernel version 4.4.0). The Raspberry Pi
was running the Raspbian Strech OS (kernel version 4.9). The
transmitter presented in Section V was compiled with GCC
and executed on each of the three computers.
B. Line Level Attack
In this sub-section we evaluate the line-level attack. We
examine the whole spectrum and strength of the generated
signal. We also measured the bit error rate and perform further
analysis.
1) Spectral View: Fig. 12 shows the power spectral density
(PSD) of the background noise in a band of 0-24kHz, as
measured in the line level. The measurements were taken
with the three computers connected to the power line during
their normal (non-transmitting) operation. The PSD presents
the background noise for each of the three computers. It’s
noticeable that the frequencies below 5kHz are significantly
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Fig. 12: The PSD of the background noise for the PC, server,
and IoT device (line level)
more noisy than the higher frequencies (5kHz-24kHz). Our
experiments show that the transmissions in the 0-5kHz band
yield high bit error rates (greater than 25%) due to the large
amount of noise and the low SNR levels. Thus, we consider
only the 5kHz-24kHz band for the transmissions in this covert
channel.
2) Signal Strength: Figure 13 shows the spectrogram of a
sweep signal (from 0 to 24kHz) transmitted from the three
computers. Fig. 14 shows the PSD of the signal. As can be
seen, the strongest signal is generated by the PC and the
weakest by the IoT. At frequencies above 12kHz, the signal
generated by a PC is stronger by 15dB than the server signal
and by 25dB than the IoT device signal. The signal power in
all three computers decreases with higher frequencies, due to
the lower amount of energy per bit.
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Fig. 13: A spectrogram of a sweep signal (line level)
TABLE II: The computers used for the transmissions
# Name Model Motherboard CPU PSU
1 PC
Silverstone
Desktop
Gigabyte H87M-D3H
Intel Core i7-4770 CPU@ 3.4GHz
4 cores (8 threads)
FSP300-50HMN 300W
2 Server IBM System x3500 M4 Intel C602J
Intel Xeon CPUE5-2620
12 cores (24 threads)
DPS-750AB-1 A 750Wx2
3 Low
power
device
(IoT)
Raspberry
Pi 3
Raspberry Pi 3
Model B V1.2
Quad Core Broadcom
BCM2837 64-bit
ARMv8,
processor Cortex A53
Stontronics DSA-13PFC-05, 5V 2.5A
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100 150 200 250 300
Time(msec)
0
5
10
15
20
25
Cu
rre
nt
 (m
A)
8 cores
6 cores
4 cores
2 cores
Fig. 15: The waveform of a transmission with various number
of cores
TABLE III: Bit Error Rates (BER)
# bit rate (bit error rate)
PC
333 bit/sec (0%)
500 bit/sec (0%)
1000 bit/sec (0%)
Server
100 bit/sec (0%)
200 bit/sec (0.96%)
333 bit/sec (4.8%)
500 bit/sec (26%)
IoT
5 bit/sec (1.9%)
10 bit/sec (4.8%)
20 bit/sec (18.2%)
3) Number of Cores: The number of cores used in the
transmission directly influences the power consumption of the
computer, (i.e., more transmitting threads result in greater
power consumption), and hence, the amount of conductive
emission. The measurements in Figure 15 show the waveform
of an alternating signal (’101010101010’) transmitted from
the PC at 10kHz. The transmissions in two, four, six, and
eight cores yield signal levels of 2.5mA, 12mA, 15mA, and
19mA, respectively. As can be seen, the number of cores used
for the transmissions is correlated with the conducted emission
measured. However, it is important to note that although using
more cores yields a stronger signal, the attacker may use only
part of available cores for the transmissions. Using all of the
cores will significantly affect the workload on the system and
might reveal the malicious activity.
4) Bit Error Rate (BER): We measured the bit error rate
(BER) for the PC, the server, and the IoT device at various
transmission rates. In these experiments we repeatedly trans-
mitted sequences of random bits, decoded them, and compared
the results with the original data. The results are summarized
in Table III.
As can be seen, with the PC we maintained bit rates of 333
bit/sec, 500 bit/sec and 1000 bit/sec without errors. With the
server we achieved bit rates of 100 bit/sec without errors, 200
bit/sec with less than 1% errors and 300 bit/sec with 4.8%
errors. The higher bit rate of 500 bit/sec yields an intolerable
error rate of 26%. With the low power Raspberry Pi we could
only maintain low bit rates of 1 bit/sec and 10 bit/sec with
1.9% errors and 4.8% errors, respectively. For 50 bit/sec we
maintained an unacceptable error rate of 18.27%.
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Fig. 16: The PSD for PC, server and IoT device (B-FSK with
7Khz and 10kHz carriers)
The results indicate that desktop computers and servers
could be used to exfiltrate a considerable amount of infor-
mation such as images, documents and keylogging data. Low
power devices are relevant for the exfiltration of small amounts
of data such as passwords, credential tokens, encryption keys
and so on.
5) Bit Error Rate Analysis: In order to maintain a reliable
channel with low BER levels, the less noisy frequencies must
be chosen. We analyze the theoretical BER limit where data
was transmitted in a quiet frequency region. For each of the
three computers (PC, server, and IoT device) we calculated the
PSD with and without the presence of the signal. In this case,
the data was transmitted in B-FSK at two quiet frequencies:
7kHz and 10kHz. The PSD in Fig. 16 shows how the power
of a signal is distributed in a range of 0-24kHz. With regard
to our communication scheme (a non-coherent B-FSK), the
theory requires a noise margin of 11dB to maintain a BER
of 10−3 and a noise margin of 8dB to maintain a BER of
2× 10−2 [54]. The PSD in Fig. 16 shows that a noise margin
of approximately 13dB is measured for the transmissions in
the quiet frequencies (7kHz and 10kHz). This indicates that in
this communication scheme it is possible to establish a reliable
channel while maintaining relatively low levels of BER. Note
that in a real world attack, it’s not always possible to select the
most quiet frequencies, since the spectral view in the target is
unknown to the attacker in advance.
C. Phase Level Attack
In this sub-section we evaluate the phase level attack. We
examine the whole spectrum and strength of the generated sig-
nal. We also measured the bit error rate. Note that background
noise at the phase level is significantly higher than the noise
in the line feeding the computer. This is due to the fact that
all of the consumers share the power line; computers, TVs,
lights, electronic devices, and so on.
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Fig. 17: The PSD of the background noise (phase level)
TABLE IV: Bit-Error-Rates (BER)
# bit rate (bit error rate)
PC
1 bit/sec (0%)
3 bit/sec (0%)
5 bit/sec (1%)
10 bit/sec (4.2%)
1) Spectral View: Fig. 17 shows the PSD of the background
noise in a band of 0-24kHz, as measured in the phase level.
The PSD represents the typical background noise in this
frequency band. As can be seen, the 15kHz-24kHz band is
less noisy than the 0-15kHz band. It is important to note that
a spectral view in the phase level is highly dependents on
the specific environment, and particularity on the amount (and
types) of the electric equipment connected to the power lines.
We considered our lab environment as representative for IT
environments in this regard. The lab consists of various elec-
trical consumers: several desktop PCs, networking equipment
(network switches and routers, Wi-Fi), office lighting, a TV,
and various types of electronic equipment.
2) Signal Strength: The spectrogram in Fig. 18 presents a
binary sequence (’1010101010’) transmitted from the PC as
measured in the phase level. The signal amplitudes at a high
value (logical ’1’) is 0.3mA and at a low value (logical ’0’) is
0.15mA (a difference of 6dB power in terms of SNR). Notably,
the measured signals are significantly weaker than the signals
measured at the line level, because of the greater amount of
noise in the phase level.
3) Bit Error Rate (BER): We measured the bit error rate for
four bit rates, with the transmitting PC. As in the line level
BER calculations, we transmitted sequences of 200 random
bits, decoded them, and compared the results with the original
data. The tests were repeated three times. The results are
summarized in Table IV.
Due to the noise in the phase level, we could only achieve
a sustainable BER with low bit rates. We maintained bit rates
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Fig. 18: B-FSK transmission in 19kHz and 20kHz
of 1 bit/sec, 3 bit/sec and 5 bit/sec with 0%, 0%, and 1%
errors, respectively. With 10 bit/sec we measured 4.2% errors.
The results indicate that in the phase level power-hammering
attack, desktop computers could only be used to exfiltrate
small amount of data such as passwords, credential tokens,
encryption keys, and so on.
D. Virtual Machines (VMs)
Virtualization technologies are widely used in modern IT
environments. In the context of security, one of the advantages
of virtualization is the resource isolation it provides. Virtual
machine monitors (VMM) provide a layer of abstraction
between the virtual machine and the physical hardware (CPU
and peripherals). Since the signal generated is tightly related
to the CPU timing and performance, we examined whether the
virtualization layer caused interruptions or delays which may
affect the signal quality.
In order to evaluate the effect of the VM, we compared
the signals generated from a physical machine (host) and the
signals generated from a VM (guest). In these measurements,
the host and the guest were running Linux Ubuntu 16.04 64-
bit. We used VMWare Workstation Player 14.0 and configured
the guest to support four processors. For the comparisons, an
identical sweep signal in the range of 0-24kHz was transmitted
from both the host and guest. The analysis of the signals
received showed that while the host was able to generate
signals in the whole frequency range of 0-24kHz, the guest
could only generate signals up to 7kHz. Fig. 19 shows the
PSD of transmissions made by host and guest machines with
two different frequencies (1kHz and 10kHz). As can be seen,
the 1kHz signal is similar in the host and guest (with levels
of -41dB). The 10kHz guest signal (-63dB) is significantly
weaker than the host signal (-47dB).
The 7kHz limitation shown above is a result of the inter-
ruptions occurring in the transmitting threads when executed
in a VM. Technically, the VMM initiates a periodical con-
text switch which suspends the transmitting process (and its
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Fig. 19: The signals generated from physical and virtual
machines at 1kHz and 10kHz
threads), in order to transfer the control to the host machine.
These interruptions effectively limit the operational frequency
of the transmitting threads to 7kHz.
E. Interference
Recall that we generate the signals by regulating the work-
loads on the CPU. Since the transmitting process (and its
theads) shares the CPU with other processes in the operating
system, we examined whether the activity of other processes
interfere with the signal generation. For the evaluation, we
tested the following workloads on the system.
1) Idle. The system is idle and only the default processes
are running in the background.
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Fig. 20: Transmissions with interfering processes
2) Word processing. The LibreOffice Writer [55] is open,
and the user is typing a document.
3) Video playing. The VLC media player [56] is playing
an HD video clip.
4) Backup. The Linux rsync [57] command is perform-
ing a backup to the HDD.
5) CPU intensive calculations. The Linux matho-primes
[58] is performing calculations of big prime numbers.
In these tests, we transmitted an alternating binary sequence
(’1010101’) in the B-FSK modulation, in the frequency band
of 16kHz-19kHz. The signals were transmitted from the PC
and measured at the line level. The measurements in Fig. 19
show that the covert channel is usable even when other active
processes are running in the system. The idle state where no
other processes interfered with the transmitting process yielded
the strongest signal of more than 20mA. Operations like video
playing, word processing and backup, decrease the signal
strength by 25% to levels of 10-15mA. The CPU intensive
operations (like calculations) add a significant amount of noise
to the generated signal, dramatically increasing the bit error
rate.
F. Multiple Frequency-Shift Keying (M-FSK)
We improved the communication performance by applying
M-FSK modulation instead of B-FSK. In this modulation, M
different carrier frequencies are used instead of two carriers in
a case of B-FSK. Each carrier frequency is encoding a different
symbol in the alphabet, as illustrated in Fig. 21a. Typically,
each symbol represents log2(M) bits.
Frequency
Time
`01`  f1
T
  4/T
f0
`11`  f3
`10`  f2
Frequencyf1 f2 f3
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3/T
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Fig. 21: Illustration of the M-FSK modulation
The resulting bandwidth, B, is illustrated in Fig. 21b and
is given by
B = M∆f + Bc ∼= 4M + 3
T
, (1)
where Bc = 3/T is the bandwidth of each modulated carrier
and ∆f = 4/T is the minimum spacing between modulation
frequencies. The resulting bit rate is given by
R =
log2(M)
T
. (2)
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Fig. 22: Spectrogram of 8-FSK transmission
Fig. 22 shows the spectrogram of a transmission in 8-
FSK modulation in the 12kHz-18kHz band, measured at the
line level. Recall that we successfully tested transmission at
1000 bit/sec in B-FSK (T = 0.001). In the case of 8-FSK
modulation (M = 8), the bandwidth is increased to R = 4000
bit/sec.
G. Attenuation
In power line communication (PLC), the quality of a signal
attenuates with the distance it travels on the wires. The
signal attenuation reported for low power (in door) electrical
networks and the frequencies of interest in our covert channel
is approximately 10dB/km [59]. Therefore, in the line level
and phase level attacks, the signal quality is affected mainly
by the noise in the electrical network and less by attenuation.
H. Stealth and evasion
The transmitting program only leaves a small footprint in
the memory, making its presence easier to hide from intrusion
detection systems. At the OS level, the transmitting program
requires no special or elevated privileges (e.g., root or admin),
and hence can be initiated from an ordinary user space process.
The transmitting code consists mainly of basic CPU operations
such as busy loops, which do not expose malicious behaviors,
making it highly evasive from automated analysis tools.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
1) Power line monitoring: A primary defensive counter-
measure in the field of covert channels is monitoring the
channel in order to detect the presence of covert communi-
cation [60]. In our case, it is possible to detect the covert
transmissions by monitoring the currency flow on the power
lines. The measurements are continuously analyzed to find
hidden transmission patterns or deviations from the standard
behavior. The monitoring can be done in a non-invasive way
using the split core current transformer used for the attack.
Note that detecting covert transmissions in the noisy spectrum
is known to be a challenging task and may not bring reliable
results [61], [62].
2) Signal filtering: Power line filters are aimed at limiting
the leakage of conduction and radiation noise to the power
lines [24], [63], [64], [25]. Such filters, also known as EMI
filters, are primarily designed for safety purpose, since noise
generated by a device in the power network can affect other
devices, causing them to malfunction. As a preventive coun-
termeasure, it is possible to limit the signal generated by our
covert channel by attaching filters to the power lines in the
main electrical service panel. Note that in order to prevent
the line level power-hammering attack, such filters must be
installed at every power outlet. This is possible by placing
filters between the power supply of the computers and the
power sockets or by integrating them into the power-supply
itself [65]. It is important to note, however, that most of
the filters designed for limiting the conducted emission are
for higher frequencies [66]. As shown in the evaluation, our
covert channel enables transmissions at frequencies lower than
24kHz, hence bypassing most of the filters. Note that there are
various regulations about the levels of radiated and conducted
emission leaked from power supplies. For example, the FCC
Part 15 certification requires that the conducted emission
be controlled in the 450kHz-30MHz frequency band. [29].
However, our covert channel utilizes a much lower frequency
band (0-24kHz), and hence works even with equipment that
is fully complaint with the regulations.
3) Signal jamming: A software level jamming solution
involves the execution of background processes that initiate
random workloads on the system. The random signals interfere
with the transmissions of the malicious process. The main limit
of this approach is that the random workloads weaken system
performance and may be infeasible in some environments
(e.g., real-time systems). Jammers can also be implemented in
a form of hardware component. In this approach, a dedicated
electronic component employ random loads on the power
lines, masking the signals generated by other devices. Note
that the hardware jammer solution is only relevant for the
phase level attack (since the jammer device is installed on
a phase level), and it is not effective against the line-level
power-hammering.
4) Host-Based Detection: In this approach, host based
intrusion detection systems (HIDSs) and host based intrusion
prevention systems (HIPSs) continuously trace the activities
of running processes in order to detect suspicious behavior;
in our case, a group of threads that abnormally regulates
the CPU workloads would be reported and inspected. Such
a detection approach would likely suffer from a high rate
of false alarms, since many legitimate processes use CPU
intensive calculations that affect the processors workload.
Another problem in the runtime detection approach is that the
signal generation algorithm (presented in Section V) involves
only non-privileged CPU instructions (e.g., busy loops). Moni-
toring non-privileged CPU instructions at runtime necessitates
that entering the monitored processes enter a so-called step-
by-step mode, which severely degrades performance [16].
Finally, software based detection also suffers from an inherent
weakness in that it can easily be bypassed by malware using
evasion techniques. In our case, the malware may inject the
transmitting threads into a legitimate, trusted (signed) process
to bypass the security mechanisms.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present PowerHammer, a new type of attack
that uses the power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped
computers. We implemented a malicious code that controls
the power consumption of a computer by regulating the
momentary utilization of the CPU cores. Data is modulated in
the fluctuations of the power consumption, and then conducted
from the power supply to the power lines. In line level power-
hammering, the attacker places a probe on the the power cables
feeding the computer. In phase level power-hammering the
probe is placed in the main electrical service panel of the
whole floor. The attacker measures the conducted emission
on the power lines, processes the signal and decodes it back
to binary information. We evaluated the covert channel in
different scenarios with three types of computers: a desktop
PC, a server and a low power IoT device. We checked the
effect of various forms of interference and the use of virtual
machines on the transmissions. We also examined detection
and prevention countermeasures. The results show that data
can be exfiltrated from air-gapped computers through the
power lines at bit rates of 1000 bit/sec for line level power-
hammering, and 10 bit/sec for phase level power-hammering.
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